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ACCIDENTS: CAUSATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW, A
FOCUS ON COAL MINING
J. DAVITT MCATEER*
If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the princi-
ple of that liability will be found to carry us to an alarming ex-
tent. He who is responsible by his general duty, or by the terms
of his contract, for all the consequences of negligence in a mat-
ter in which he is the principle, is responsible for the negligence
of all his inferior agents. If the owner of the carriage is there-
fore responsible for the sufficiency of his carriage to his ser-
vant, he is responsible for the negligence of his coachmaker, or
his harness maker, or his coachman. The footman, therefore,
who rides behind the carriage, may have an action against the
master for a defect in the carriage owing to the negligence of
the coach-maker, or for a defect in the harness arising from the
negligence of the harness-maker, or for drunkenness, neglect, or
want of skill in the coachman; nor is there any reason why the
principle should not, if applicable in this class of cases, extent to
many others. The master, for example, would be liable to the
servant for the negligence of the chambermaid, for putting him
into a damp bed; for that of the upholsterer, for sending in a
crazy bedstead, whereby he was made to fall down while asleep
and injure himself; for the negligence of the cook, in not properly
cleaning the copper vessels used in the kitchen; of the butcher,
in supplying the family with meat of a quality injurious to the
health; of the builder, for a defect in the foundation of the
house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the ser-
vant by the ruins.1
I. INTRODUCTION
It was in 1837 that a creative British jurist wrote these won-
drous words as he struggled to rationalize the right of an em-
*B.A. 1966, Wheeling College; J.D. 1970, West Virginia University College of
Law.
Ed note. The author is an attorney with the Center for Law and Social
Policy in Washington, D.C. Since 1980, Mr. McAteer has been a member of the
National Coal Issue's Advisory Board.
' Priestley v. Fowler, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1032 (1887).
1
McAteer: Accidents: Causation and Responsibility in Law, a Focus on Coal M
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ployer to insulate himself from responsibility for the health and
safety of his employees. Today we find these words funny and
faintly embarrassing. The thinking behind them, however, no
matter how absurd, is still alive and prevalent in some quarters.
Since 1837, civilization has moved onward and, in many
respects, upward. Today, we accept the proposition that society
may write rules governing standards of occupational safety and
health, and we accept, at least in principle, the proposition that
employers must observe these rules. We are inclined, therefore,
to look upon Priestley2 as a quaint echo from the past. However,
this zany defense of laissez faire capitalism still has its staunch
supporters. You find them wherever coal operators are gathered
together. They will object bitterly to this characterization, but
the harsh fact is that many mine owners and managers still cling
to the notion that accidents are caused primarily not by working
conditions but by workers. Until this attitude changes, coal min-
ing will continue to amass the worst health and safety record in
American industry.
II. LEGAL HISTORY
From the day that the first shift of laborers left work in the
home for work in the factory, there has been a succession of
schemes for dealing with industrial accidents. The first of these
schemes was built on common law rules of employer liability,
enunciated during a period of intense industrialization when the
dominant philosophy was a combination of laissez faire capital-
ism and utilitarianism.3
The employer's responsibility at common law was very
limited, consisting of a brief list of duties set forth by the
Id.
The extent of the employer's responsibility, although it was said to
rest on the understanding of the parties, was undoubtedly fixed by the
courts upon the basis of old industrial conditions, and a social
philosophy and attitude toward labor, which are long since outmoded.
The cornerstone of the common law edifice was the economic theory
that there was complete mobility of labor, that the workman was an en-
tirely free agent, under no compulsion to enter into the employment.
W. PROSSER, HANBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 80 at 525 (4th ed. (1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
[Vol. 83
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courts.' These duties conceivably could have given afforded em-
ployees broad protection. Unfortunately, they were given a very
narrow and formalistic interpretation reminiscent of common
law forms of action. An employee who could not fit his complaint
into one of five very specific recognized duties was left without
a judicial remedy. With respect to these five duties, the stan-
dard of care was the same as that imposed by other tort law
duties. Ordinary and reasonable care was all that was required
of the employer. In determining whether the employer breached
his duty of care, "common practice" figured significantly. If the
employer's action which caused the employee's injury was com-
monly practiced by employers throughout the business, there
was no breach of duty by the employer and consequently no re-
covery by the employee.5 Additionally, the employer was not
responsible for ordinary risks and dangers associated with a
particular type of work. Employees could not recover for in-
juries considered natural to their employment, but only for
those injuries incurred as a direct result of the employer's
negligence.'
The common law rule reflected the belief that the respon-
sibility for accidents lies primarily with the individual employee
and his co-workers.' This belief is exposed at two stages of the
At common law, for the protection of his employees, the employer has the
duty to provide: (1) a safe workplace, (2) safe appliances, tools, and equipment for
the employee to do his work with, (3) warnings of dangers of which the employee
might reasonably be expected to remain ignorant of, (4) a sufficient number of
suitable fellow employees, and (5) the promulgation and enforcement of rules of
conduct for employees which would make the work safe. Id. at 526.
The master is not bound to furnish for his workmen the safest and
best machinery nor to provide the best methods for the work, in which
he is engaged, to save himself from responsibility for injury to his ser-
vant. If the machinery or appliances, which he has, be of an ordinary
character and such, as can with reasonable care be used without danger
to the employee, it is all that can be required of the employer.
Barnes v. Gaston Coal Co., 27 W. Va. 285, 300 (1885) (emphasis added).
See e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (1 Metcalf)
49 (1842) (Shaw, C.J.).
' The servant is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his
master, and may, if he thinks fit, decline any service in which he
reasonably apprehends injury to himself: and in most of the cases in
which danger may be incurred, if not all, he is just as likely to be ac-
quainted with the probability and extent of it as the master.... In fact,
to allow this sort of action to prevail would be an encouragement to the
1981]
3
McAteer: Accidents: Causation and Responsibility in Law, a Focus on Coal M
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
common law analysis: first, in the decision as to whether the
employee has a cause of action, and second, in the defenses
available to the employer. Unless the employee could phrase his
complaint so as to fit within the narrow confines of one of the
recognized duties, he was adjudged without a cause of action.
Even if the complaint did allege a breach of a recognized duty,
the court might still conclude that there was no cause of action
on the principle of volenti non fit injuria'
The very existence of an employer duty, therefore, was
dependent upon the employer's knowledge of unsafe working
conditions and the employee's ignorance of those conditions. Un-
less both elements were present simultaneously, the likely
holding would be that there had been no breach of duty. The em-
ployer's duty "reaches its vanishing point in the case of those
who are cognizant of the full extent of the danger and voluntarily
run the risk."'
An employee who succeeded in the formidable task of
establishing a cause of action was soon met by the "unholy trinity"
of common law defenses: (1) contributory negligence, (2) assump-
tion of the risk, and (3) the fellow servant rule." Even where the
employer had admittedly violated a common law duty, these three
defenses reflected the belief that the accident still was the
employee's responsibility.
Under the defense of contributory negligence, the employee
could not recover if any part of the accident was due to his own
negligence. The doctrine "frequently meant that a momentary
servant to omit that diligence and caution which he is duty bound to ex-
ercise on behalf of his master, to protect him against the misconduct or
negligence of others who serve him, and which diligence and caution,
while they protect the master, are a much better security against any
injury the servant may sustain by the negligence of others engaged
under the same master, than any recourse against his master for
damages could possibly afford.
Priestley v. Fowler, supra note 1, at 1032-33.
' He who consents cannot receive an injury. See e.g., Poole v. Lutz and
Schmidt, 273 Ky. 586, 589, 117 S.W. 575, 576 (1938).
9 Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685, 695 (1887) (A brewery employee
was scalded when he fell into an unfenced vat did not have a cause of action
against his employer, notwithstanding the court's admission that the employer
had a duty to fense the vat.).
"0 PROSSER, supra note 3, § 80 at 526-30.
[Vol. 83
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lapse of caution on the part of the workman was penalized by
casting the entire burden of injury upon him, in the face of [the]
continued and greater negligence of the employer.""1
The theory behind the doctrine of assumption of the risk is
that the employee understands and consents to bear the in-
herent risks of his occupation. According to this rule, certain
conditions are inevitable and unavoidable. By accepting the job,
or continuing to work, the employee was deemed to have volun-
tarily accepted the threat of injury. Another version of the same
defense applied when the danger, although not ordinarily associ-
ated with the type of work, was deemed to be patent and ob-
vious. 2
The fellow-servant rule, which absolves employers from lia-
bility for all employee injuries caused by the actions of other
employees, was enunciated first in England in 1837,11 and was
quickly adopted by American courts. 4 Since almost all industrial
work is done by the employer only indirectly, through the direct
k 1& at 527 (emphasis added).
12 In one case a 19 year old plaintiff was employed to remove boards from a
planing machine. With only three weeks experience on the machine, the plaintiff
was ordered to make adjustments to the machine. However, the plaintiff was not
given instructions on how to perform the adjustments. While working on the
machine, the plaintiff cut his fingers. The court, in non-suiting the plaintiff,
reasoned that the law imposes upon an employee the duty of self-protection and
assumes that this deeply rooted instinct will put him on guard against all the
risks incident to, or arising out of the course of, his employment which the
employee knows of or has the means of discovering. "The servant, when he enters
into the relation, assumes, not only all the risks incident to such employment, but
all dangers which are obvious and apparent." Crown v. Orr, 140 N.Y. 450, 452, 35
N.E. 648 (1893) (O'Brien, J.).
13 Priestley v. Fowler, supra note 1. The Priestley court rested its precedent
setting judgement on "general principle" and on a fear of the "parade of
horribles" that would follow from a rule that would allow the servant to sue his
master.
" The general rule, resulting from considerations as well as justice as
of policy, is, that he who engages in the employment of another for the
performance of specified duties and services, for compensation, takes
upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the
performance of such services, and in legal presumption the compensa-
tion is adjusted accordingly. And we are not aware of any principle
which should except the perils arising from the carelessness and
negligence of those who are in the same employment. These are perils
which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as ef-
fectually guard, as the master. They are perils incident to the service,
1981]
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action of an employee, the rule had potentially devastating ef-
fects. Its application brought anomolous results: a non-employee
injured by an employee could recover against the employer,
while an employee injured by another employee could not."5
The rationales offered in support of these defenses are not
unlike those put forth today in support of the contention that ac-
cidents are caused by workers, not by working conditions. One
of the more absurd supporting arguments employed was that of
voluntariness. 16 The employee freely choose to submit himself to
and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for in the rate of
compensation as any others.
We are of the opinion that these considerations apply strongly to the
case in question. Where several persons are employed in the conduct of
one common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each depends
much on the care and skill with which each other shall perform his ap-
propriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others, can
give notice of any misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty, and leave
the service, if the common employer will not take such precautions, and
employ such agents as the safety of the whole party may require. By
these means, the safety of each will be much more effectually secured,
than could be done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity
in case of loss by the negligence of each other. Regarding it in this light,
it is the ordinary case of one sustaining an injury in the course of his
own employment, in which he must bear the loss himself, or seek his
remedy, if he have any, against the actual wrong-doer.
Besides, it appears to us, that the argument rests upon an assumed
principle of responsibility which does not exist. The master... is not ex-
empt from liability, because the servant has better means of providing
for his safety, when he is employed in immediate connexion with those
from whose negligence he might suffer; but because the implied con-
tract of the master does not extend to indemnify the servant against
the negligence of any one but himself; and he is not liable in tort, as for
the negligence of his servant, because the person suffering does not
stand towards him in the relation of a stranger, but is one whose rights
are regulated by contract expressed or implied.
Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., supra note 6, at 57-60 (Shaw, C.J.)
(emphasis in original).
See also, Murray v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMullan) 385
(1841).
15 Compare Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., supra note 6, with
Corrigan v. Union Sugar Refinery, 98 Mass. 577 (1868).
" This principle is virtually indistinguishable from the defense of assump-
tion of the risk. The reasoning behind both doctrines is essentially the same-the
employee consented to the risk and consequently does not deserve relief. Courts
[Vol. 83
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these dangers, from which he could withdraw at any time, and
hence the responsibility for the injury was entirely his. The doc-
trines of contract, implied contract, and waiver were used as
conduits for this argument. 17 A related argument, applicable to
dangers inherent in the type of employment, is that compen-
satory mechanisms take account of the risks involved in purely
free and unrestricted transactions. It envisions that an em-
ployee working in a particularly dangerous situation would de-
mand and receive compensation commensurate with the degree
of danger. Both arguments obviously assume perfect mobility of
labor and a frictionless flow of information concerning the
dangers involved in industrial activities. However, both
arguments neglect the inability of individual laborers to haggle
with owners over the terms and conditions of employment.
The self-protection argument was another verbal buttress
for the common law edifice. 8 It held that the worker has more of
an interest in preventing accidents than does the employer, and
that the worker, therefore, is best suited to the responsibility.
This argument ignores that workers also have an interest in
eating, which might dissuade them from abandoning what may
well be their only source of sustenance, however "freely chosen"
in might be.
A related argument, especially applicable to the contri-
butory negligence and fellow servant defenses, was that employ-
used this reasoning inter-changeably either to find no duty on the employer's
part, or to support a denial of recovery even where a duty had existed and had
been breached. The employee often encountered essentially the same conceptual
hurdle at two different points.
11 Surely, it cannot be said that a workman does not impliedly contract
to take the obvious risks from the conditions of the machinery when he
agrees to work in the repair of it. Nor can it any more be said that he
does not impliedly make a similar contract when he agrees to work in a
business involving obvious dangers by reason of the inferior machinery
with which he knows it is to be carried on. He is free to accept the ser-
vice or not, as he chooses; and if harm comes to him by reason of his ac-
ceptance of it, he suffers voluntarily.
O'Malley v. South Boston Gaslight Co., 158 Mass. 135, 138, 32 N.E. 1119, 1121
(1893).
In O'Malley, the plaintiff who had been employed by the defendant for 15
weeks fell while wheeling a coal barrel on an unguarded run. The employer's
failure to provide guardrails was a violation of a statutory duty.
" Supra note 7.
19811
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ees would be deterred from careless conduct and would look out
for other careless employees if they were unable to shift the
burden of their injuries to the employer. The courts reasoned
that a plaintiff who has learned of the law of contributory
negligence by the hard experience of losing a verdict is likely to
be more careful in the future.19 Proper training and safety educa-
tion would achieve the same end, without such pain, but that
alternative was not taken seriously by either courts or
employers.
These rationalizations, largely unpersuasive, hide a more
fundamental tenet which prompted the courts to evolve the com-
mon law rules of employer liability in the manner which they
did. Throughout the development of these rules, the idea per-
sisted that it would be unreasonable and unfair to hold the
employer responsible for the employee's injuries where the
danger was a "natural incident" to the type of work contracted
for, or wheie the accident was caused by anything other than
the direct personal action of the employer.0 The general
philosophical underpinning of this conception of fairness and
reasonableness seems to have been a reverence for individual-
ism in conjunction with a worship of industry.
From the language of their opinions,2 it is clear that the
courts saw themselves as protecting "freedom of action", pre-
sumably including the freedom of individual workers to contract
for dangerous employment as well as the freedom of individual
" Supra note 15.
The economic development of the times were accompanied by the
growth of individualistic political and economic philosophies which
regarded as a great social good freedom of action, in nearly all direc-
tions, particularly on the part of the entrepreneurial class. Naturally,
this would decry placing serious burdens on the new and promising
system and would deplore the tendency of juries to lose sight of broader
philosophical objectives in their sympathies in the single case before
them. It was in this climate of opinion that the liability of defendants
became limited by the fault principle and that courts came to be regarded
as the refuge of those who could not protect themselves-not for those
who could (according to the individualistic notions of the times), but
simply failed to do so.
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1198-99 (1956).
See generally, R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT
1860-1915 (1945).
2 See e.g., Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. Corp., supra note 6; Barnes
v. Gaston Coal Co., supra note 5.
[Vol. 83
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employers to conduct their business as they wished. It is also
clear, from their unwillingness to burden industry with the cost
of injuries which could be explained as inevitable and inherent
in particular types of employment, that the courts were en-
deavoring to coddle industry.
The harshness with which injured employees were treated
under common law rules became an important topic for concerned
observers.' By 1907, magazine writers were writing article
after article about industrial casualties and injuries.' Tremen-
dous numbers of injuries and fatalities occurred during that
year, especially in the coal mining industry. That same year
marked the birth of the American safety movement.24 With
public interest aroused and focused on industry, some corpora-
tions took action to stave off further public criticism and pre-
vent the imposition of stricter requirements. For example, in
1910 United States Steel instituted a private workmen's com-
pensation scheme, the Voluntary Accident Relief Plan, under
which workers who signed away the right to sue the company in
court would be compensated (minimally) for their injuries."
12At the end of the nineteenth century, the crisis at the workplace became
critical. "[W]hen occupational injury and death rates were at new highs, seven-
eights of all persons who were injured at work were without legal relief." U.S.
BUREAU OF MINES, DEP. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 623, STATE COMPENSATORY PROVI-
SIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 2 (1967).
The early part of the twentieth century was marked by a series of coal mine
disasters in the United States. Federal and State commissions which were
established following these disasters, were critical of the existing system. Id.
1 See e.g., EASTMAN, A Year's Work Accidents and Their Costs, XXI
CHARITIES 1143 (1909); MARK, Our Murderous Industrialism, XI WORLD TODAY 97
(1907).
See also, C. EASTMAN, WORK ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW, THE PITTSBURGH
SURVEY (1908).
24 D. LESCOHIER, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932: WORK-
ING CONDITIONS, 366-70 (1935).
1 United States Steel's "voluntary" action is understandable considering
that:
[Bly 1910, when the movement for workmen's compensation legislation
had gained full headway, almost every state had enacted laws which
modified the common-law doctrines of employers' liability. This mass of
legislation ranged from little more than affirmations of common-law doc-
trines to complete abrogation of certain of the employer's common-law
defenses. The aim in most instances was to give the injured worker a
little better prospect of success in the great gamble of a court suit for
damages.
1981]
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Critics of the common law scheme seldom seriously addressed
the possibility that industrial accidents could be prevented.
Their solutions almost invariably focused on compensation
rather than prevention.
In 1909, Montana became the first state to enact workmen's
compensation legislation.28 By 1920, fourty-two states had a
workmen's compensation statute.' These statutes which were
enacted by the several states were modeled on the German Act
of 1884. The workmen's compensation scheme which evolved in
this country, without common law litigation,' established sche-
dules which pre-determined the benefits payable for specific in-
juries,' irrespective of fault." The cost of industrial accidents
were to be treated as any other cost of doing business and were
to be passed on to the consumers. Lloyd George, the British
statesman, cynically referring to the British workmen's compen-
sation system said: "The cost of the product should bear the
blood of the workman."31
It is worth mentioning that workmen's compensation legis-
lation was supported by several, though by no means all, of the
The legislation on employer's liability enacted prior to the workmen's
compensation period may be classified as follows:
1. Statutes denying the right to "contract out" of liability.
2. Statutes extending the right of suit in death cases.
3. Statutes abrogating or modifying the common-law defenses of
co-service, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.
E. BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932: LABOR
LEGISLATION, 567 (1935).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. title 92.
= West Virginia enacted its compensation statute in 1913. See, W. VA. CODE
ANN. chapter 23.
The right to workmen's compensation is wholly statutory and is not in any
way based on the common law. The statutes are controlling and the rights,
remedies and procedures provided by them are exclusive. See e.g., Bailes v.
Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 152 W. Va. 210, 161 S.E.2d 261 (1968).
See e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-6 (1980 Cum Supp.).
= The common law tort system with its defenses- of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule was con-
sidered inimical to the public welfare and was replaced by a new and
revolutionary system wherein "fault" became immaterial-essentially a
no-fault system.
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (W. Va. 1978).
*1 U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, DEPT. OF LABOR, BULL. No. 623, STATE COMPEN-
SATORY PROVISIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 3 (1967).
[Vol. 83
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business organizations that were formed. Industrialists perceived
that workmen's compensation schemes, with their ever-present
waiver of common law rights,32 were preferable to schemes
under which industry might have to take action to prevent ac-
cidents, or offer more complete compensation. They were joined
in their support for the compensation schemes by at least one
sector of organized labor, the American Federation of Labor.,
The philosophy behind workmen's compensation maintains
that there is an acceptable trade-off when an injured worker
who can expect some form of minimal income security surren-
ders the right to sue his negligent employer. Though still firmly
imbued in American industry, this tenet is being eroded gradu-
ally by a growing awareness that compensation is less important
than prevention.1 Over many decades, and only after bitter
struggle, employers have slowly been forced to accept the idea
that they must meet certain minimum standafds designed to
create a more inherently safe and healthful work environment.
Behind this development is many complex theories about
the relationship between economic gain and social accountabili-
ty. There is in all of them, however, the appealingly simple no-
tion that the work environment does in fact lend itself to
systematic improvement. A noisy machine can be quieted. A hot
warehouse can be cooled. A steep roadway can be graded, and a
heavy vehicle can be equipped with rugged brakes. More recently,
the idea has begun to take hold that the greater work environ-
ment can also be enhanced. A smokestack can be retrofitted to
control its effluent. A city need not destroy the river that flows
through its environs. This philosophy carries a price tag, and
when it confronts economic pressures its momentum may be
slowed, temporarily stalled, or even reversed. But there seems
2 See e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-6 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
1 E. BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1896-1932: LABOR
LEGISLATION, 575-76 (1935).
The workmen's compensation system completely supplanted the com-
mon law tort system only with respect to negligently caused industrial
accidents, and employers and employees gained certain advantages and
lost certain rights they had heretofore enjoyed. Entrepeneurs were not
given the right to carry on their enterprises without any regard to the
life and limb of the participants in the endeavor and free from all com-
mon law liability.
Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., supra note 30, at 913 (emphasis added).
1981]
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relatively little doubt that it is an increasingly accepted
philosophy exerting great force on and within almost all in-
dustries.
Ironically, the American coal mining industry is the one
notable exception. Historically, legislative improvements have
come only very slowly and only after spectacular disasters have
aroused public support. Dead miners have always been the most
powerful force in securing passage of mining legislation. 5
III. COAL MINING Is DANGEROUS
As the number of accidents/deaths will confirm, a coal mine
is a dangerous place to be in or work in. This simple fact has
been recognized by some industry observers, although its recog-
1907: Monongah, W. Va. explosion kills 358.
1908: Jacobs Creek, Pa. explosion kills 239.
1909: Marianna, Pa. explosion kills 154.
1910: First federal enacted Bureau of Mines created in U.S. Dept.
of the Interior, but lack enforcement power.
1940: Bartley, W. Va. explosion kills 41.
1940: Neff, Ohio explosion kills 72.
1940: Portage, Pa. explosion kills 63.
1941: Bureau of Mines inspectors given power to accompany state
inspectors in mines.
1947: Centralia, Ill. explosion kills 111.
1951: West Frankfort, Ill. explosion kills 119.
1952: Bureau of Mines given limited power to issue notices of viola-
tion and withdrawal orders when imminent danger exists.
1963: Federal Metal/Non Metal-Act (Public Law 87-300). A two
page law authorizing a study of safety problems.
1965: Tennessee explosions kill 14.
1966: Bureau of Mines authorized to inspect small mines (15 or less
miners) and Federal Metal and Non-Metal Safety Act gives
Bureau inspection power-but can only issue "advisory"
regulations to industry.
1968: Farmington, W. Va. explosion kills 78.
1969: Federal Coal Mine Safety and Health Act. First strong
federal mining law on paper. Enforcement weak.
1970: Hurricane Creek, Ky. explosion kills 38.
1972: Kellogg, Idaho Sunshine Mine fire kills 91.
1976: Oven Fork, Ky. explosions kill 26.
1977: Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, Public Law 91-173.
Coverage Extended to all miners. Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) encouraged to enforce extensive
regulations covering all aspects of health and safety and stan-
dards improved for metal/non-metal miners.
J. MOATEER, THE MINER'S MANUAL, 346-47 (1981).
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nition is not as widespread as one might expect. But in fact,
mines are dangerous, extremely so. They are dangerous for a
number of reasons not typically found in other industrial set-
tings:
(1) Mining by definition involves movement. Miners are not
normally stationary. In each 24 hour period, the work location
changes entirely.
(2) Mining occurs in a hostile environment. The tunnelling
nature of underground mining requires supporting the roof after
extraction. After the coal is removed the earth attempts to ad-
just itself to the removal, causing roof falls and shifting.
(3) Miners must be supplied air during their work periods.
(4) Methane gas is frequently present in coal mines, adding
the danger of violent explosion to an already confined environ-
ment.
(5) Most mining is carried out in poor light. Even with pre-
sent illumination requirements, 8 mining takes place under less
than ideal visibility.
(6) Present day mining is conducted with large, high speed
machines, which dominate the work area and are difficult to con-
trol and manuever.
(7) Mining is as much an art as it is a science. Extraction
techniques give way to the reality of unique coal seams, each
with its own characteristics and conditions.
(8) The training of miners is not now, nor has it ever been, of
sufficient quality, consistence, throughness, or repetitiveness as
is needed."
(9) Known, proven and available safety precautions are not
being applied throughout the industry.
30 C.F.R. §§ 75.200 - 75.200-14 (1980).
[I]t is the industry's responsibility to offer adequate training; it has
not done so. And the government has failed for allowing miners to die
and suffer injury because of inadequate training. On this point, we
agree with the Senate Human Resources Committee when it said: "...
the fact that regulations requiring said training [training on self preser-
vation and safety practices] have not been promulgated is a serious
failure in mine safety administration.
Oversight Hearings on the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (Excluding
Title IV, Before the Sub-comm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on
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(10) Maintenance is often neglected because of problems
with repair logistics, scheduling, and the speed of mining.
IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACCIDENTS
There are two principle schools of thought regarding the
cause of accidents in the 'American coal industry, and any
number of sub-divisions within each school. The two principal
theories are; first, that accidents are caused by or are the result
of the miner's mistakes or some greater force such as Mother
Nature or God; second, that accidents are caused by or occur
because of the working condition and environment of the mines.
This philosophical distinction has far-reaching implications; men
live and die based upon it.
A. Theory Number One-The Miner,
Mother Nature, God
According to the first theory, mining deaths can and should
be explained by a three tiered approach. Individual miners are
at fault for their own death or injury because of their mistakes.
In addition, an individual miner could be responsible for the
death of several of his fellow workers. When the number of
deaths is above one but below 15, however, it is normally at-
tributed to Mother Nature. But what of the large disasters when
tens of hundreds are killed? No miner's fault theory could ex-
plain the loss of 250 miners at one time, nor could the blame be
laid plausibly on Mother Nature. The answer was found in the
spiritual realm with the advent of the act of God theory of
disasters.
1. The Miner As the Bad Guy
If the fault theory is extended to its logical end, it must be
concluded that miners are the most accident prone workers in
Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 561 (1977) (statement of L. Thomas
Galloway and J. Davitt McAteer) [hereinafter cited as 1977 House Oversight
Hearings].
Because miners are people, and because people make mistakes and forget
what they have learned, training must be extremely developed for every level of
mining. Corporate presidents and bath house attendants alike must be trained
and retrained, to reduce the frequency of short cuts and the number of prevent-
able errors.
[Vol. 83
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American industry. However, the miner by the very nature of
his job does not control all of the factors which can increase or
decrease the potential for mining accidents. He does not control
the illumination, the size and bulk of the equipment, or the
suitability of the roof. Thus, the miner's ability to effectively
protect his own life or that of his fellow worker is severly
limited.
Miners are not inherently suicidal as a group, nor are they
candidates for safety sainthood. Miners are people like the rest
of us. Some take short cuts. Some do not follow precautions all
of the time. Some allow their minds to wonder at the wrong mo-
ment, just as we all do. And a few do violate basic safety and
health principles all of the time. Anyone who has ever rolled
through stop signs or cut corners on safety at home will under-
stand these actions.
2. The Margin of Error
Miners suffer more accidents than most workers because
the margin of error is narrower in a mine than in most other
work places. Small mistakes in a supermarket normally will not
subject a stock clerk to fatal risks. This is not the case in a mine.
Knowing that mining conditions are especially dangerous, and
knowing that human beings will make mistakes and taks short
cuts, industry must build a larger margin of safety into the min-
ing machines and training programs. Special precautions must
be made a matter of routine in the mines.
3. The Higher Duty
Even if we were to accept the idea that miners are somehow
more like lemmings that the rest of us, and that somewhere
deep in their souls they want to get hurt, there still would be a
fallacy in this position which mine operators would have to con-
front sooner or later. We would have to look upon the em-
ployer/employee relationship as a matter of fiduciary respon-
sibility, with all the requirements that such a relationship car-
ries.
The analogy that suggests itself here is obvious. When you
deposit your money in a bank, the banker accepts a responsibility
to manage it in such a way that your risks are kept within clearly
defined limits. Because the historical track records of bankers is
1981]
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not as exemplary as we might wish, governmental agencies have
been established both to monitor the banker and to provide an
insurance system if the banker doggedly ignores his fiduciary
responsibility.
To a degree, the same system can be, and has been, imposed
on coal mining. Since the individual miner does not control the
managerial decisions of the corporate entity, he is at risk when
he deposits his body, hoping to earn a dividend in the form of a
paycheck. Government can and does scrutinize miner managers
to see that they make their decisions in conformity with generally
accepted principles, but there is no fall-back system, as there is
in banking, for the simple reason that a life once lost cannot be
made whole, as an investment can. Therefore, the fiduciary
responsibility of the mine manager is even greater than that of
the banker. Accordingly, he should be willing to subject himself
to even more stringent governmental scrutiny. As we know,
however, this has not been the mining industry's position.
B. Theory Number Two- Working Conditions
The opposing theory of accident causation is that mining
conditions are the cause of most accidents in the mines. The pro-
ponents of this theory further assert that the power to eliminate
accidents lies in the power to improve present mining condi-
tions.' Until recently, the importance of mining conditions has
not been widely recognized. Conditions are by far the greatest
cause of accidents; and if conditions cause accidents, conditions
can be changed to minimize the probability and frequency of ac-
cidents.
V. SOLUTIONS
Consistent with the proposition that mining accidents are
primarily caused by the miner's negligence, the coal industry
maintains that the rate of fatal accidents will best be reduced by
increasing efforts in miner training programs. There are, how-
ever, two major shortcomings with this solution. First, training
is only temporarily effective. With time, both the contents and
" In its most extreme form, this theory also fails to square with reality. Ex-
tended to its logical conclusion, it would advocate the complete mechanization of
the mines as the solution to mining accidents. Without men in the mines there
would be no fatal accidents.
[Vol. 83
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the intensity of the training are lost or diminished. Continued
retraining is necessary to assure any chance of effectiveness.
Secondly, training does not eliminate the problem. Only by
changing conditions in the mines can permanent solutions be
found to the problem.
These two divergent philosophies came into strong focus
during the Congressional hearings which lead to the passage of
the 1977 amendments" to the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act." The industry's view was expressed by Ralph
Bailey, Chairman of the Board of Consolidation Coal Company,
speaking on behalf of the Bituminous Coal Operators Associa-
tion and the National Coal Association. Bailey, arguing that en-
forcement was misdirected, began his analysis by addressing
the Act's significance, as he saw it:
The 1969 act was probably the most significance piece of legisla-
tion ever enacted by congress to regulate working conditions in
an American industry. It has revolutionized coal mining opera-
tions and has impacted heavily on productivity and production
costs.
Fatalities have been reduced but not eliminated. However, a
disturbing statistic remains-in our opinion, there has not been
enough improvement in the industry's lost time accident fre-
quency rate. The coal industry is prepared to join with you in
our common effort to improve mine safety and eliminate the
avoidable threat of accidents from our mines.
To some critics, the lack of real progress in lost time accident
reduction is the result of the industry's not complying with the
spirit of the law, and they therefore would propose more laws,
tougher penalities, higher fines, and more enforcement as a
solution. We believe that such a course of action will perpetuate
the problem rather than contribute to its solution.
Most physical elements of the working environment in a coal
mine can be controlled through the use of safe mining prac-
tices-and Federal law requires that these practices be em-
ployed. However, it must be recognized that most elements
related to worker safety are not controllable by legislation,
- Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (1980).
40 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83
Stat. 742 (1970).
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regulation, or the unwarranted punitive action that manage-
ment at all levels of America's mines so deeply resents.
Consolidation Coal Company has always had a strong commit-
ment to safety, and we have been fortunate to have experienced
an accident frequency well below the industry's average. As
previously reported to this committee, through a careful analy-
sis of accidents at our mines, we have determined that over 85
percent of all of our accidents could be assigned to a lack of
training and education, poor work habits, or a lack of motiva-
tion.
In other words, even if the mine and equipment were in perfect
condition and in full compliance with the law, a substantial ma-
jority of the accidents would still have occurred."
Bailey went on to cite a 1976 Kentucky Deep Mining Safety
Commission Report as supporting his contention. 2 This Commis-
sion made up of a majority of coal mine operators, or former coal
mine operators, cited Consolidation's own study in saying:
"Also, Kentucky miners pay the price for careless and unsafe
work habits. Some studies conclude that as high as two-thirds of
all fatalities can be attributed to unsafe work habits. 4 3
Yet, the Kentucky Commission also found that:
The cause of accidents and fatalities and the rates in Kentucky
do not differ significantly with other major coal producing
States. As might be expected, fall of roof in the number one
killer, accounting for roughly 40 percent of all fatalities. Inex-
perience, whether defined as inexperience in mining in general,
or inexperience on a specific job or task, is a major contributor
to many accidents and fatalities."
Roof and rib falls are the single largest cause of fatalities in
America's deep coal mines." Notwithstanding compliance with
the roof control plan,"' individuals are not in control of the roof
when it collapses. The room and pillar mining system employed
"1 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 37, at 316-17 (statement of
Ralph E. Bailey) (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 317.
' Id
"Id
'5 The Mine Safety and Health Administration compiles accident reports on
all fatal mining accidents.
15 30 C.F.R. §§ 75.1719 - 75.1719-4 (1980).
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in 95 percent of all American mines, simply is inadequate to pro-
tect against roof or rib falls. Both rank and file miners and su-
pervisory personnel are killed yearly because of either inade-
quate roof control, or the failure to follow known precautions. In-
dustry is anxious to, and in fact does, attribute these accidents
to human error.
In every other major coal producing country, however,
fatalities from roof or rib falls have virtually been eliminated by
utilization of the long wall mining technique. On longwalls,
miners work under a full canopy which drastically reduces the
number of times miners are exposed to risk. Roof fall fatalities
were reduced in the United Kingdom not because British miners
are more safety-conscious than their American counterparts, but
rather because of a system modification. In other words, chang-
ing the working conditions decreased the potentiality for fatal
roof falls.
Not all mechanical solutions would involve such drastic de-
partures from the mining techniques which are currently used
in domestic mines. Small modifications of equipment can result
in the elimination of safety hazards. In the General Blumenthal
mine, for example, hand and finger accidents on the man trip
were eliminated by the placement of wire screens in the window
slits where miners previously rested their hands, exposing them
to danger.
47
The American mining industry, however, places itself four-
square behind training, and against "over regulation", as the
proper solution. 8 The industry maintains that the miners must
be motivated to work with safety in mind.49 Management, there-
," Interview with Safety Director Rainsow, June, 1979. Interview notes are
on file with the author.
," 1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 37 at 318 (statement of Ralph
E. Bailey).
'" But, I must say, that training and education in themselves are no
panacea for the industry's accident problem. What, in addition, must be
done is to find a way to motivate people to think and work safely. All
miners must want to observe safety laws, rules and regulations, and
perform their daily task without endangering themselves and their
fellow workers. Short-cutting the rules or regulations has resulted in
numerous injuries that both MESA's records and the industry's records
will reveal.
1981]
19
McAteer: Accidents: Causation and Responsibility in Law, a Focus on Coal M
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1981
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
fore, would place the burden of avoiding accidents on the
miners.
The basics, therefore, of the American mining industry's
present position on accident reduction are: better motivation,
additional training, and less regulation. 0 However, noticeably
absent is the concept, accepted throughout Europe of designing
out accidents. European industrialists utilize technology to eli-
minate carbon copy accidents. Failure to recognize their respon-
sibility to take this approach traps American management into
repeating past mistakes,5 with disastrous consequences befal-
ling the miners.
There is no question as to the need for effective training and
retraining. That the United States requires the least amount of
training for miners or supervisors of any major coal producing
country points to a failure on the part of government, industry,
and union." The lack of sufficient training, however, is not as
glaring as the total lack of a design-avoidance element in the
American mine safety plan.
Yet, in both West Germany and Britain,53 the designing out
See, Oversight Hearings on the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amend-
ments Act of 1977 Part 3. Coa4 Metal and Surface Mine Construction Before the
Sub-comm. on Health and Safety of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 609 (1980) (statement of Joseph P. Brennen).
11 A review of MSHA's fatal accident reports, supra note 45, reveals multiple
carbon copy accidents.
McATEER & GAALOWAY, A Comparative Study of Miners' Training and
Supervisory Certification in the Coal Mines of Great Britain, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Poland, Romania, France, Australia and the United States:
The case for Federal Certification of Supervisiors and Increased Training of
Miners, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 937 (1980).
" European safety efforts are built around management objectives in both
safety and productivity.
There is of course the general vague objective of creating safe pits, but
quantification is possible and desirable. There must be no confusion
with objectives and targets or aims. The target must be zero fatalities,
but this would never be accepted as an objective for accountability pur-
poses. An objective has to be set that is capable, by effort, or achieve-
ment.
The author has proposed objectives ... in relation to fatalities:
1977 under 45
1980 under 20
early 1990s less than 10
These are not guesses and depend on his view of the classes of ac-
[Vol. 83
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of accidents is considered of equal importance as the training
and retraining of miners. The British safety plan consists of four
elements, ranked in order of their permanent effectiveness:
(1) Design,
(2) Devices,
(3) Training,
(4) Exhortation."
This list is but a small part of the type of program which can
be mounted now in the confident expectation of reducing ac-
cidents. Such a program is the full extention of the type of think-
ing that permits quantified safety objectives to be set.5 Not
even the most successful of safety programs could set the risk at
zero, but a truly successful program would considerably reduce
the risks and appreciably curtail the number of mining ac-
cidents. Accidents can be reduced systematically, with produc-
tivity in mind, by designing mines and mining equipment which
will allow and compensate for human fallibility. 6
cidents now amendable to elimination by design and engineering effort.
The point is that managing toward objectives means not just setting
them and then merely hoping for success. It means the deliberate pro-
gramming of effort, with resources, at removing hazards and then not
hoping to achieve the objectives but expecting to do so.
COLLISON, Managing Health and Safety in a Period of Change, 1976 SYMPOSIUM ON
HEALTH, SAFETY AND PROGRESS 3.1, 3.8 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as CoL-
LINSON].
Between 1977-1980, there has been an average of 28 deaths a year in the
British coal mines. There are approximately the same number of miners
employed in deep mines in the United Kingdom as in the United States.
Telephone interview, Office of Labor Attache, British Embassy, Washington,
D.C. (March, 1981).
Such quantification of safety objectives and the method of obtaining them is
rare in the American mining industry. In the United States, such analysis is less
thorough, thoughtful or widely accepted. It is interesting to note, therefore, that
Consolidation Coal Company which is the nation's largest employer of miners has
as the slogan for its safety program "Zero Accidents."
COLLINSON, supra note 53, at 3.9.
Supra note 53.
DEFENSE TO BE BUILT
CLASS OF FATALITY INTO THE PROGRAMME
Overturning surface mobile ROPS (Roll-over Protection
plant structures)
Haulage chain whip and Chainless haulage
breakage
1981]
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The only American attempt at designing and operating our
mines with our miners' health and safety in mind is the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,"T as amended in 1977.11
Industry's response to this effort was to vigorously object to the
Act's passage and now to just as vigorously complain of "over
regulation."
In 1977, in response to the industry's assertion that 85 per-
cent of all accidents are caused by workers' habits, lack of
motivation, or poor education and training, 9 .L. Thomas Gallo-
way and I testified before the Subcommittee on Labor Stan-
dards of the House Committee on Education and Labor.
... Our analysis of MESA's investigation reports presents a
strikingly different picture of the cause of accidents than does
the industry presentation. Our analysis based on MESA in-
vestigation reports indicates that in 76% of the cases in 1975,
management negligence or failure to exercise due care in con-
trolling the physical conditions of the mine was at least a con-
tributing factor to the accidents.
In contrast to the 76% caused in part by management failure,
poor work habits and/or insufficient training was one of a
number of factors in only 58% of the cases according to MESA
investigations. Moreover, violation of the mandatory safety
standards was a contributing factor to the accident in 72% of
the cases."
Trapped by shaft gates Interlocked shaft gates
Collapsed roadheads Power supported roadheads
Broken wood lockers Steel lockers
Crane jib electrocution Crane jib field detectors
Reversing locomotives Elimination of reversal facility
Tension-end slewing Built-in stelling facility
Mobile machinery slewing Remote umbilical operation
Burst hydraulics and machinery Built-in check values
movement
Objectives can be set not only for "fatals". But fatals are used as an ex-
ample to illustrate that any success with fatals may be expected to have
a similar and largely proportionate beneficial effect on other classes or
injury and indeed on the non-injury accidents and thereby improve pro-
ductivity.
COLLINSON, supra note 63, at 3.9.
B? Supra note 40.
" Supra note 39.
5' Supra note 41.
1977 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 37, at 559-60 (statement of L.
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VI. CONCLUSION
American mining industry official have historically, and are
presently, attempting to place the blame for mining accidents on
either the miner, or in some instances, lower management." This
approach, which has been the cornerstone for industry during
the last four years, has had the predictable result of greatly
decreasing the emphasis on rectifying or changing the condi-
tions which lead to accidents. Carbon copy accidents become the
rule, rather than the exception. Permanent solutions are aban-
doned for a temporary patch work approach which is more eco-
nomical in the short-term, but more costly in the long-term.
Rather than spending their time and energy on discovering how
miners' actions lead to accidents and fatalities, the American
coal industry would be better off both financially and ethically
to analyze accidents to determine how they can be eliminated.
Yet, industry turns a deaf ear to any such notions. The needlessly
lost lives are the responsibility of higher management which up
to now has closed out the option of permanent solutions.
If the industry continues to place the burden on the miners
or lower management and to spend their time analyzing ac-
cidents in an effort to determine the failure of the miners, little
progress will be made. If, on the other hand, industry will
recognize that accidents are due to a combination of factors and
that they can be permanently eliminated by designing a safe
work place, all of us will be better off.
Thomas Galloway and J. Davitt McAteer) (Our testimony indicated that accidents
were due primarily to management negligence or failure to exercise due care in
controlling the physical conditions of the mines.).
6 Normally, higher management does not place responsibility or blame upon
itself. Rarely do lower management officials get the opportunity to submit in-
dependent testimony.
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